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Abstract. The automation of the deductive approach to program veri-
fication crucially depends on the ability to efficiently infer and discharge
program invariants. In an ideal world, user-provided invariants would be
strengthened by incorporating the result of static analysers as untrusted
annotations and discharged by automated theorem provers. However,
the results of object-oriented analyses are heavily quantified and cannot
be discharged, within reasonable time limits, by state-of-the-art auto-
mated theorem provers. In the present work, we investigate an original
approach for verifying automatically and efficiently the result of certain
classes of object-oriented static analyses using off-the-shelf automated
theorem provers. We propose to generate verification conditions that are
generic enough to capture, not a single, but a family of analyses which
encompasses Java bytecode verification and Fähndrich and Leino type-
system for checking null pointers. For those analyses, we show how to
generate tractable verification conditions that are still quantified but fall
in a decidable logic fragment that is reducible to the Effectively Propo-
sitional logic. Our experiments confirm that such verification conditions
are efficiently discharged by off-the-shelf automated theorem provers.
1 Introduction
In recent years, the automation of deductive program verification frameworks
(e.g., [5,15,26,10]) has made impressive progress. Proving the functional correct-
ness of real programs can now be done with reasonable effort. A major automa-
tion breakthrough is due to the improvements of automated theorem provers
(ATPs) (notably Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers [18,12,6]) that al-
low to routinely and efficiently discharge first-order verification conditions. At
the same time, static analysers have also made significant progress. They can
infer automatically sophisticated invariants that would strengthen user-provided
invariants and therefore automate further the verification process. Yet, this po-
tential for further automation has not fully materialised yet. Indeed, there are
still obstacles hindering the systematic integration of static analysis results into
deductive program verification frameworks.
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2There are two main approaches for integrating automatically generated in-
variants into deductive program verification frameworks depending on whether
static analyses results are trusted or untrusted. Static analyses that are trusted
are usually built into the verification methodology. For instance, spec♯ [5] is
using @NonNull type information [20] to generate Boogie [4] intermediate code
and the Why3 platform [10] is using an effect system to tame aliasing. In this
scenario, those static analyses are part of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB).
Hence, the addition of a novel analysis is potentially jeopardising the soundness
of whole verification methodology. In another approach, static analyses results
are untrusted and are treated as candidate invariants which, following the veri-
fication process, are transformed into verification conditions that are eventually
discharged by automated theorem provers. For instance, candidate invariants
generated by Houdini [21] are validated by ESC/Java [22]. This integration
scheme has the advantage that static analyses are not part of the TCB and
therefore an error in the static analysis, or a misinterpretation of the static anal-
ysis result, cannot compromise the soundness of the verification methodology.
This latter approach comes with both theoretical and practical challenges. If
the static analysis and the verification methodology are grounded on semantics
that are too far apart, filling the semantic gap may prove unfeasible or be re-
sponsible for an unbearable encoding overhead. Semantic discrepancies can show
up in multiple places. A typical example is the modelling of machine integers
in case of overflows: is it an error or a normal behaviour? More serious is the
question of the memory models that can be incompatible, especially if the ver-
ification methodology enforces a hardwired alias control mechanism or object
ownership. In the propitious case that the analysis result can be encoded in log-
ical form with reasonable overhead, there is absolutely no guarantee that the
verification conditions will be automatically discharged by automated theorem
provers. Because static analyses operate over a program logic that is essentially
computable, the loss of decidability comes from the logic encoding of the static
analysis result. This absence of (relative) completeness of ATPs w.r.t. a particu-
lar static analysis makes this approach for validating static analyses fragile and
unpredictable.
This paper aims at ensuring that proof obligations originating from static
analysis results can be discharged with certainty by automated theorem provers.
The result certification of static analyses has been studied for its own sake. How-
ever, existing works propose ad hoc solutions that are specific to a single analysis
e.g., for polyhedral program analyses [9] and register allocation in the CompCert
C compiler [29]. A universal solution, working for arbitrary analyses, is very likely
impossible. We propose an intermediate solution which leverages the deductive
power of automated provers and covers a relevant family of static analyses for
object-oriented languages. For this family, we show how to generate tractable
verification conditions that are reducible to the Effectively Propositional (EPR)
fragment of first-order logic. This fragment is decidable and in practise state-of-
the-art automated provers are able of discharge the proof obligations.
3We shall consider static analyses that have been defined using the theory of
abstract interpretation. The first step in the result verification consists of trans-
lating the elements of the analyser’s abstract domain into a logical formalism in
which the semantic correctness of the analysis can be expressed. Our transla-
tion is defined using the concretisation function γ of the abstract interpretation
which maps abstract domain elements to properties of the concrete semantic
domain. More precisely, it translates abstract domain elements associated to
program points into pre- and post-conditions, expressed in Many Sorted First
Order Logic (MSFOL). Running a Verification Condition Generator (VCGen)
on such an annotated program results in a set of proof obligations expressed
in first-order logic. These Verification Conditions (VCs) are then given to be
proved by ATPs. As already mentioned, this is no formal guarantee that ATPs
will be able to discharge those proof obligations. For object-oriented analyses,
the formulae make extensive use of quantifiers and are therefore challenging
for ATPs. This very work is motivated by the experimental observation that
state-of-the-art ATPs are in practise incapable of discharging those formulae.
An important part of this paper is therefore concerned with identifying a logical
fragment for expressing pre-, post-conditions and VCs, and to present a method
for transforming these VCs into VCs that can be discharged efficiently.
1.1 Overview
Our approach to get tractable verification conditions is to restrict our attention
to a family of object-oriented static analyses. Each static analysis in the family
is equipped with a specific base abstract domain and is thus equipped with a
specific concretisation function. Yet, the lifting of this analysis specific concreti-
sation function to the program heap is generic and shared by all the analyses
in the family. We exploit these similarities to generate specialised verification
conditions that are reducible to EPR. To demonstrate the approach, we have
developed result certifiers for two different object-oriented static analyses be-
longing to the family: a bytecode verifier (BCV) [28] for Java and Fähndrich
and Leino type-system [20] for checking null pointers.
We restrict ourselves to static analyses based on the theory of abstract
interpretation [17]. In this framework static analyses are defined w.r.t. a col-
lecting semantics which extracts the properties of interest from the program
concrete semantics. For formalisation purposes, we give a core object-oriented
bytecode language (see Section 2) a mostly small-step operational semantics
· → · ⊆ State × State , i.e., a small-step semantics with big-step reduction for
method calls. A program state (e, h, p) ∈ Env ×Heap×PP is a triple where e is a
local environment mapping variables to locations; h is a mapping from locations
to objects representing the heap and p is the current program point. The se-
mantics is fairly standard except for a generic instrumentation of instance fields.
This instrumentation is expressed using a dedicated IF domain with a specific
element inull and an operation ifield that models field update.
inull : IF ifield : IF → IF
4Fields of a newly created object are tagged by inull and the ifield function is
called whenever a field is updated. Using the terminology of deductive verifi-
cation, for each field, we add a ghost field that is updated together with the
concrete field. By construction, the instrumentation is transparent i.e., erasing
the instrumentation has no impact on the semantics.
Each static analysis is defined by a particular instrumentation (IF , inull , ifield)
and by an abstract domain Abs equipped with a concretisation function:
γ : Abs → P(State)
As collecting semantics we consider the set of reachable instrumented states
Reach of the program semantics. A correct (over-)approximation of Reach is an
abstract element b♯ ∈ Abs whose concretisation is such that Reach ⊆ γ(b♯). As a
result, verifying the static analysis result amounts to proving the following proof
obligation:
s ∈ γ(b♯) ∧ s→ s′ ⇒ s′ ∈ γ(b♯)
Providing the concretisation function and the program semantics can be axioma-
tised in first-order logic, the proof obligation can be sent to ATPs such as SMT
solvers or first-order provers. In our case, the logic embedding does not incur
a particular encoding overhead as it is demonstrated by our modelling of the
semantics [7] using the Why platform.
This approach has demonstrated its effectiveness to certify the result of nu-
merical analyses [16]. However, for object-oriented analyses, ATPs fail to dis-
charge the proof obligation because the formulae quantify over infinite domains
such as the set of memory locations. An obvious optimisation that simplifies the
task of the prover consists in splitting the proof obligation into program point
specific verification conditions. In our experiments, off-the-shelf ATPs still fail
to reliably and consistently discharge all the proof obligations. This absence of
(relative) completeness of ATPs w.r.t. a particular static analysis makes this
approach for validating static analyses fragile and unpredictable.
To alleviate the problem, provers could be tuned on a per analysis basis.
However, this solution is fragile and comes without any formal guarantee: what
about its robustness w.r.t. slight modifications of the static analysis? Here, we
explore another solution that is robust and does not require any modification of
the provers. We propose to tame static analyses so that, by construction, proof
obligations fall in fragments that are well-understood by the prover and are
therefore discharged reliably. The family of static analyses we have identified can
be characterised almost syntactically by the definition of concretisation function.
As a result, the static analysis designer can have the guarantee that the proof
obligations will be discharged without any knowledge of the internals of the
provers. The proof obligations we generate are easily reducible to Effectively
Propositional logic. This logic is still quantified but decidable and, as the ATP
System Competition shows, existing provers are already tuned for this logic.
Our family of analyses is parametrised by a base abstract domain Val ♯ for
abstracting values (see Section 3). This abstract domain is automatically lifted
5to the program abstraction Abs.
Heap♯ = F → Val ♯ × Val ♯ Env♯ = Var → Val ♯ Abs = Heap♯ × (PP → Env♯)
This abstraction corresponds to static analyses that are flow-sensitive (the ab-
straction of local variables is program specific) and heap-insensitive (the abstrac-
tion of the heap is shared by every program-point). The abstraction of fields is
relational: a field f is abstracted by a pair (v1, v2) ∈ Val
♯ × Val ♯ such that v2 is
the abstraction of x.f providing v1 is the abstraction of x. This family of analyses
encompasses well-known static analyses such as Java bytecode verification [28]
and Fähndrich and Leino type-system for checking null pointers [20].
For this family of analyses, we show how to generate verification conditions
of the following shape (see Section 4.1):
∀c¯ ∈ Class , f¯ ∈ F , i¯ ∈ IF , v¯ ∈ Var .φ
where c¯, f¯ , i¯, v¯ are vectors of universally quantified variables and φ is a quantifier-
free propositional formula built over the following atomic propositions
p ::= v♯ ∈ γnull | (c, f, i) ∈ γL(v
♯) | c  c | f ∈ c.
In this definition, γnull and γL are used to specify the concretisation of the base
domain Val ♯,  is a subclass test and f ∈ c checks whether a field belongs to
a class. As soon as the domain IF is finite, quantifications are only over finite
domains. Thus, the formulae are Effectively propositional providing that γL can
be expressed in this fragment.
Using our approach, the designer of the analysis can verify at the analysis
level the logic fragment the verification conditions will fall into. This is a formal
guarantee that makes this technique for verifying the analyses results very ro-
bust. In practise, even if the formulae are decidable, the provers might not be
complete. Our experiments show that for EPR the provers are really efficient at
discharging our verification conditions.
1.2 Organisation
In Section 2 we present a small object-oriented language with its operational
semantics. Section defines the family of analyses we consider and presents the
encoding of Java bytecode verification and Fähndrich and Leino type-system for
checking null pointers [20]. For this specific class of analyses, Section 4 shows
how to generate verification conditions in the EPR fragment. A prototype im-
plementation in Why3 is described in Section 5. Section 6 reviews related work
and Section 7 concludes.
2 Language, Syntax and Semantics
In the formalisation, we consider a core object-oriented language. Let PP , Var ,
Class , Method and F be finite sets of program points, variable names, classes,
6method names and field names. The set Var contains distinguished elements for
the this pointer, the parameters p0 and p1 and the method result res.
Var ∋ x ::= this | p0 | p1 | res | . . .
Stmt ∋ s ::= x := null | x := y | x := y.f | x := new C | x := y.c.m(x, y)
| x.f := y | Ifnull(x, pc) | skip
Programs: In our model, a method (c, m) ∈ Class×Method is identified by its
defining class c and its name m. Its entry point (written (c.m)0) and its exit point
(written (c.m)∞) are given by the mapping sig ∈ Class ×Method → (PP × PP )⊥.
The code is described via two functions: get_stmt ∈ PP → Stmt returns the
statement at program point; the normal successor of a program point p is written
p+. For a conditional statement Ifnull(e, p′), if e is null, the successor is p′,
otherwise it is p+. The class hierarchy is represented by a relation extends
relating a class and its direct super-class. The subclass relation  is defined as the
reflexive, transitive closure of extends. Each class defines a set of fields. We write
f ∈ c for a field that is either defined or inherited by c, i.e., recursively defined
by a super-class of c. The lookup function models virtual method dispatch and
is defined if a matching method is found by walking-up the class hierarchy. We
identify a method signature by a defining class and a method name.
lookup : Class → (Class × Method ) → Class⊥
Semantics: The semantic domains are built upon an infinite set of locations
L, and parametrised by an unspecified domain IF of field annotations. At object
creation, field annotations are tagged by inull ∈ IF and updated at field updates
by the ifield : IF → IF function. Values are either a location or the constant
null ; an environment is a mapping from variables to values; an object is a pair
made of a class and a mapping from fields to values and annotations of fields;
the heap is a partial mapping from locations to objects. A state is a tuple of
Env ×Heap × PP . Given a state s, we have s = (s.env, s.hp, s.cpp). We add a set
of error states Err for null pointer dereferencing and calls to undefined methods
or lookup failure.
Val = L ∪ {null} Env = Var → Val Obj = Class × (F → Val × IF )
Heap = L → Obj
⊥
State = Env × Heap × PP Err = {NullPointer ,LookupFail}
The semantics rules are given in Fig. 2 of Appendix A. We use a mostly
small-step presentation of the semantics, defining inductively a relation → be-
tween successive states in the same method and modelling method calls by the
transitive closure →∗ . The rules for modelling method calls are given below
SCall
s.env[y] = l s.hp[l] = (c, o) s.env[a0] = v0 s.env[a1] = v1
lookup(c)(c0,m) = c
′ sig(c′,m) = (pbeg, pend)
env′ = (λx.null)[this← l][p0 ← v0][p1 ← v1]
s✄c0,m ((env
′ , s.hp , pbeg), pend)
Call
get_stmt(s.cpp) = x := y.c0.m(a0, a1) x is assignable
s✄c0,m (init , pend) init −→
∗ end end .cpp = pend
s −→ (s.env[x← end .env[res]], end.hp, s.cpp+)
7The side-condition x is assignable means that x /∈ {this, p0, p1} and ensures
that those variables are not mutable. The rule [SCall] is responsible for initialising
the environment of a called method and retrieving the method exit point. The
rule [Call] models method invocation.
Figure 3 of Appendix A. describes the semantics of programs “which go
wrong”. The semantics is blocking with respect to ill-formed programs (assign-
ment to the variables this, p0 and p1), but programs leading to null pointer
dereferencing or method not found lead to special error states (NullPointer and
LookupFail).
The set of reachable states are obtained by the reflexive, transitive closure
of the relation _ which enriches the semantic relation → with states reachable
from sub-calls.
s→ s′
s _ s′
get_stmt(s.cpp) = x := y.c0.m(a0, a1) x is assignable
s✄c0,m (s
′, pend)
s _ s′
The set of reachable states for an initial set S0 of initial states is then defined as
Reach = {s | s0 ∈ S0 ∧ s0_
∗s}.
The role of static analyses presented in the next section is to compute an
abstract over-approximation Abs of the set of reachable states (Reach ⊆ γ(Abs))
that can rule out the run-time errors NullPointer and LookupFail .
3 Defining a Family of Analyses
To obtain a more parsimonious embedding of abstract domains into pre- and
post-conditions, we restrict ourselves to a particular class of analyses. This class
is defined by a parametrisation of the operational semantics and of the concreti-
sation of the analyses it contains.
3.1 Parametrised Analyses
We restrict our attention to analyses parametrised by a particular instrumenta-
tion of the semantics (IF , ifield , inull) and an abstract domain Val ♯. A variable
x is abstracted in a flow-sensitive manner by an element v ∈ Val ♯; a field f is
abstracted in a flow-insensitive manner by a pair (v1, v2) ∈ Val
♯×Val ♯ such that
v2 is the abstraction of x.f providing v1 is the abstraction of x. The form of the
abstract domain is defined by
Heap♯ = F → Val ♯ × Val ♯ Env♯ = Var → Val ♯ Abs = Heap♯ × (PP → Env♯)
The concretisation function γ : Abs → P(State) is parametrised by γnull
and γL that are used to build the concretisation γVal of values. In the seman-
tics, a value is either the constant null or a location l. The constant null can be
8abstracted by any abstract value v part of γnull ⊆ Val
♯. As locations are abstrac-
tion of memory addresses in the semantics, a concretisation function γL : Val
♯ →
P(L) would make little sense. The purpose of γL : Val
♯ → P(Class × F × IF )
is to relate in the heap the class of the location and the instrumentation of the
fields. As a result γVal is parametrised by a heap h and is defined as follows:
v♯ ∈ γnull
null ∈ γhVal (v
♯)
h(l) = (c, o) ∀f ∈ c.(c, f, o(f)2) ∈ γL(v
♯)
l ∈ γhVal (v
♯)
The abstraction of environments is defined component-wise, i.e., the abstraction
of each variable is non-relational.
∀x, e(x) ∈ γhVal (e
♯(x))
e ∈ γhEnv(e
♯)
The abstraction of the heap is also non-relational and each field is abstracted by
a pair of abstract values.
∀l, c, o.h(l) = (c, o) ⇒ (∀f ∈ c.(c, f, o(f)2) ∈ γL(h
♯(f)1) ⇒ o(f)1 ∈ γ
h
Val (h
♯(f)2))
h ∈ γHeap(h♯)
Finally, the abstract domain Abs is a set of pairs of an abstract heap h♯ and a
flow-sensitive abstract environment e♯fs : PP → Env
♯.
e ∈ γhEnv
(
e♯fs(p)
)
h ∈ γHeap
(
h♯
)
(e, h, p) ∈ γ
(
h♯, e♯fs
)
In the rest of this section, we model well-known analyses: Java byte-code verifi-
cation [30] and a null-pointer analysis à la Fähndrich and Leino [20].
3.2 Bytecode Verification
For our core language, the purpose of byte-code verification consists in ensuring
the absence of LookupFail errors. This error cannot be triggered if for every call
instruction x := y.c0.m(a1, a2) the class of y is a subclass of c0. To rule out this
error, byte-code verification would compute as abstraction for y a class c that
is a subclass of c0. Byte-code verification does not require any instrumentation
of the semantics. An abstract value v ∈ Val ♯ = Class⊥ is either a class c which
represents either null or any object of class c′  c, or ⊥ which represents null.
IF = {⊥} inull = ⊥ ifield(i) = ⊥ γnull = Val
♯ γL(c) = {(c
′, f, i) | c′  c}
3.3 Null Pointer Analysis
Our parametrised concretisation can also model more sophisticated analyses sim-
ilar to the null-pointer analysis of Fähndrich and Leino [20]. A key insight of
9the analysis is the notion of raw type: an object of type raw(c) is such that
all the fields of c (or inherited from super-classes) are initialised. The crux
is that the flow-insensitive abstraction of the heap is only valid for initialised
fields. Hubert et al., have formalised Fähndrich and Leino’s type system in
the context of abstract interpretation [25]. In order to track down the initial-
isation state of fields, they are using an instrumented semantics which anno-
tates field with the status def (defined) as soon as their are initialised. With
our semantics, this behaviour is modelled by the following instrumentation:
IF = {def , undef } inull = undef ifield(i) = def .
For precision, the analysis requires this to be given a more precise ab-
straction than other variables. Instead of a raw type, this is abstracted by
an explicit mapping f ∈ F → {Def ,UnDef } where Def means definitively de-
fined and UnDef means may be defined. In our framework, all the variables are
treated in an homogeneous way and doing a special case for this is not possi-
ble. As a result, in our abstraction, all the variables are treated like this. This
is a generalisation as a raw type raw(c) is just a compact representation for
λf . if f ∈ c then Def else UnDef .
Another deviation from Fähndrich and Leino or Hubert et al., is that our
new statement is just allocating memory but does not calls a constructor. To
precisely track down the state of a newly created object of class c, we introduce
the type cˆ which represents a totally uninitialised object of class exactly c.
IF ♯ = {Def ,UnDef } Val ♯ = {MaybeNull ,NotNull} ∪ Ĉlass ∪ (F → IF ♯)
The typeMaybeNull represents an arbitrary value and NotNull represents a non-
null object with all its fields initialised. The type cˆ represents an uninitialised
object of class (exactly) c and a mapping F ∈ F → IF ♯ represents an object
such that the initialisation state of a field f is given by F (f).
γIF (Def ) = {def } γIF (UnDef ) = IF γnull = {MaybeNull}
γL(MaybeNull) = Class × F × IF γL(NotNull) = {(c, f , v) | f ∈ c ⇒ v = def }
γL(cˆ) = {c} × F × IF γL(F ) = {(c, f, v) | f ∈ c⇒ v ∈ γIF (F (f))}
A feature of this analysis is that the abstraction of the heap is only valid for
initialised field. This property is obtained as soon as an abstract heap h♯ ∈ Heap♯
is such that h♯(f)1(f) = def .
4 Generating Tractable Verification Conditions
The verification conditions generated for our restricted class of analyses are not
automatically discharged by off-the-shelf provers. A significant difficulty is that
the formulae quantify over the (infinite) set of memory locations and do not fall
into known decidable fragments. To tackle this problem, our approach consists
in generating abstract verification conditions that are geared towards the family
of parametrised analyses presented in Section 3.1.
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4.1 Almost Effectively Propositional Logic
The EPR logic, also known as the Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey (BSR) class, is
a decidable fragment of first-order logic where formulae are of the form
∃∗∀∗.φ
where φ is a quantifier-free formula without function symbols. Piskac et al. [35]
have shown how to decide EPR formulae extended with equality using the SMT
solver Z3. Fontaine [23] has shown that the BSR class can be combined with
decidable theories under mild assumptions (more relaxed than the standard
Nelson-Oppen combination scheme). This makes this logic a good target for
our verification conditions.
After transformation, our optimised verification conditions are of the form
∀c¯ ∈ Class , f¯ ∈ F , i¯ ∈ IF , v¯ ∈ Var .φ
where c¯, f¯ , i¯, v¯ are vectors of universally quantified variables and φ is a quantifier-
free propositional formula built over the following atomic propositions
p ::= v♯ ∈ γnull | (c, f, i) ∈ γL(v
♯) | c  c | f ∈ c.
Here, v♯ is a constant of the abstract domain Val ♯; c is either a constant class
name or a class variable bound in c¯; f is either a constant field or a field variable
bound in f¯ ; i is an annotation of the form ifieldn(i) where i is either a constant
annotation or an annotation variable bound in i¯; x is a variable.
In those formulae, constants play the role of existential variables. Observe
that ground formulae c  c′ and f ∈ c are syntactic properties of programs that
can be evaluated. The subclass predicate  is defined as the reflexive transitive
closure of the extends relation. Fixpoints, even in the restricted form of transi-
tive closure, are not expressible in first-order logic and are therefore outside the
EPR fragment. We sidestep the difficulty by tabulating the relation subclass.
We also tabulate the fact that a field f belongs to a class c. The translation
is quadratic in the worst case. However, in practise, class hierarchies are never
very deep [37]. The remaining atoms are static analysis dependent. Therefore,
the reducibility to EPR is a property of the static analysis that can be decided
by just looking at the definitions of γnull and γL .
The byte-code verification logic is trivially reducible to EPR: The atomic
formula v♯ ∈ γnull always holds because null belongs to any abstract element v
♯.
Moreover, (c, f, i) ∈ γL(v
♯) reduces to c  v♯.
The null-pointer logic is also reducible to EPR. The atomic formula v♯ ∈ γnull
can always be evaluated; it holds if and only if v♯ = MaybeNull . Atomic formulae
of the form (c, f, i) ∈ γL(v
♯) can be encoded in EPR extended with the theory
of equality and a F interpreted function.
(c, f , i) ∈ γL(MaybeNull) iff True
(c, f , i) ∈ γL(NotNull) iff f ∈ c ⇒ v = def
(c, f , i) ∈ γL(cˆ
′) iff c′ = c
(c, f , i) ∈ γL(F ) iff f ∈ c ⇒ F (f ) = Def ⇒ i = def
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The theory of equality can be reduced to EPR [35] and is not a problem. In
this specific case, the interpreted function F is known and defined over a finite
domain. For a given F , the formula F (f) = Def can therefore be expanded into
a (finite) disjunction
∧
F (f ′)=Def f
′ = f . The obtained formula lies within the
required fragment.
For these restrictions to be of interest we must show that our verification
conditions can be expressed in this fragment. This is far from evident and is
proved in Section 4.2
4.2 Abstract Verification Conditions
We show how to obtain sound abstract verification conditions The essential
property of the VCs is that they fall in the logic fragment identified in Section 4.1.
The reduction has been formally proved in Coq and is available [7].
Our verification conditions require the instrumentation to be monotonic
w.r.t. to the abstraction of location.
∀v♯, c, f, i.(c, f, i) ∈ γL(v
♯) ⇒ (c, f, ifield(i)) ∈ γL(v
♯)
This property has already been identified as being instrumental for coping with
multi-threading [20]. In a sequential setting, it could be relaxed at the cost of
introducing an additional quantification modelling the fact that, for instance,
during a method call the instrumentation can be updated an arbitrary number
of times.
The VCs given in Fig. 1 use the following short-hands.
v♯1
•
⊑ v♯2
△
=
∧ v♯1 ∈ γnull ⇒ v♯2 ∈ γnull
∀c, i, f ∈ c.(c, f, i) ∈ γL(v
♯
1) ⇒ (c, f, i) ∈ γL(v
♯
2)
v♯1
•
⊓ v♯2
•
⊑ v♯3
△
=
∧ v♯1 ∈ γnull ∧ v♯2 ∈ γnull ⇒ v♯3 ∈ γnull
∀c, i, f ∈ c.
(c, f, i) ∈ γL(v
♯
1) ∧ (c, f, i) ∈ γL(v
♯
2) ⇒ (c, f, i) ∈ γL(v
♯
3)
Given an abstraction (H,E) ∈ Heap♯ × (PP → Env♯) of the program, we
generate for each program point p a verification condition VC ♯
(H,E)
p for the
statement s ∈ Stmt such that get_stmt(p) = s. For each method signature
m′ ∈ Class ×Method which overrides a method m ∈ Class ×Method in a sub-class,
we also generate abstract verification conditions VC ♯
(H,E)
(m′,m) modelling the
usual variance/co-variance rules for method redefinitions. The comprehensive
VCs are given in Fig. 1. In all rules, the terms of the statement on which the
VC is produced are capital letters in a True-Type font (e.g., x) and the two
parts of the abstraction are written in italic capital letters. We do not indicate
the sorts of the quantified variables to keep the formulae readable, but all v are
variables in Var , c are classes in Class , f are fields in F , i are instrumentations of
fields in IF , except in the VC for call instructions, where it is specified ∀i ∈ {0, 1}
to avoid repeating the condition.
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VC ♯(skip)
(H,E)
cpp = ∀v.E(cpp)(v)
•
⊑ E(cpp+)(v)
VC ♯(x := null)
(H,E)
cpp =
{
∀v 6= x.E(cpp)(v)
•
⊑ E(cpp+)(v)
∧E(cpp+)(x) ∈ γnull
VC ♯(x := x′)
(H,E)
cpp =
{
∀v 6= x.E(cpp)(v)
•
⊑ E(cpp+)(v)
∧E(cpp)(x′)
•
⊑ E(cpp+)(x)
VC ♯(x := y.f)
(H,E)
cpp =


∀v 6= x.E(cpp)(v)
•
⊑ E(cpp+)(v)
∧∀c, i.
f ∈ c⇒
(c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(cpp)(y))⇒
((c, f, i) ∈ γL(H(f)1)⇒ H(f)2 ∈ γnull)⇒
E(cpp+)(x) ∈ γnull
∧∀c, c′, f ′, i, i′.
f ∈ c⇒
(c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(cpp)(y))⇒
((c, f, i) ∈ γL(H(f)1)⇒ (c
′, f ′, i′) ∈ γL(H(f)2))⇒
(c′, f ′, i′) ∈ γL(E(cpp
+)(x))
VC ♯(x := new c)
(H,E)
cpp =


∀v 6= x.E(cpp)(v)
•
⊑ E(cpp+)(v)
∧∀f ∈ c.(c, f, inull) ∈ γL(E(cpp
+)(x))
∧∀c′, f ∈ c′.(c′, f, inull) ∈ γL(H(f)1)⇒ H(f)2 ∈ γnull
VC ♯(x.f := y)
(H,E)
cpp =


∀c, i.
f ∈ c⇒
(c, f, i) ∈ E(cpp)(x)⇒
(c, f, ifield(i)) ∈ E(cpp+)(x)
∧∀v 6= x.E(cpp)(v)
•
⊑ E(cpp+)(v)
∧∀i, c, f ′ 6= f.
f ∈ c⇒
(c, f ′, i) ∈ γL(E(cpp)(x))
(c, f ′, i) ∈ γL(E(cpp
+)(x))
∧E(cpp)(y)
•
⊑ H(f)2
∧∀c, f ′, i.
(c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(cpp)(x))⇒ (c, f, ifield(i)) ∈ γL(H(f
′)2)
VC ♯(x := y.c.m(v0, v1))
(H,E)
cpp =


∀i, f, c′ 4 c.(c′, f, i) ∈ γL(E(cpp)(y))⇒ (c
′, f, v) ∈ γL(E((c, m)0)(this))
∧∀i ∈ {0, 1}.E(cpp)(vi)
•
⊑ E((c, m)0)(pi)
∧E((c, m)
∞
)(res)
•
⊑ E(cpp+)(x)
∧∀v /∈ {x, y, v0, v1}.E(cpp)(v)
•
⊑ E(cpp+)(v)
∧E((c, m)
∞
)(this)
•
⊓ E(cpp)(y)
•
⊑ E(cpp+)(y)
∀i ∈ {0, 1}.E((c, m)
∞
)(pi)
•
⊓ E(cpp)(vi)
•
⊑ E(cpp+)(vi)
VC ♯(Jnull(x, p′)
(H,E)
cpp =


E(cpp)(x) ∈ γnull ⇒ E(cpp
+(x)) ∈ γnull
∧∀v 6= x.E(cpp)(x) ∈ γnull ⇒ E(cpp)(v)
•
⊑ E(cpp+)(v)
∧∀c, i, f ∈ c.(c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(cpp)(x))⇒ (c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(cpp
+)(x))
∧∀c, i, f, v 6= x.(f ∈ c⇒ (c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(cpp)(x)))⇒ E(cpp)(v)
•
⊑ E(p′)(v)
VC
♯(H,E)(m′,m) =


E(m′∞)(res)
•
⊑ E(m∞)(res)
∧∀c 4 class(m′), f, i.(c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(m0)(this))⇒ (c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(m
′
0)(this))
∧∀i ∈ {0, 1}.E(m0)(pi)
•
⊑ E(m′0)(pi)
∧∀v /∈ {this, p0, p1}.E(m0)(v) ∈ γnull
Fig. 1. Optimised verification conditions
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Assignments. We produce different VCs for assignments x := e depending on the
expression e. If e is simply null, then the VC simply propagates the information
on all variables different from x and checks that the abstract value for x at the
next program point can represent a null value.
VC ♯(x := null)(H,E)p =
{
∀v 6= x. E(p)(v)
•
⊑ E(p+)(v)
∧E(p+)(x) ∈ γnull
The other VC for assignment deals with instructions of the form x := x′, and
checks that the information on x′ are propagated to the information on x at
the next program point, replacing the condition E(p+)(x) ∈ γnull by E(p)(x
′)
•
⊑
E(p+)(x).
Method calls. Along the same lines, most of the conditions of the VC for call
statements x := y.C.M(V0, V1) simply check that the correct information is prop-
agated. First, the information on all local variables that are not concerned by
the call—variables that are neither x, y, V0 nor V1—must be propagated to the
next program point.
∀v /∈ {x, y, V0, V1}. E(p)(v)
•
⊑ E(p+)(v)
Then, the VC must check that the pre-condition of the method called is
enforced, i.e., it must check that the information on the argument of the call
y,V0 and V1 implies the information on the parameter this,p0 and p1 at the
entry point of the method. We take the entry point of the implementation of
the method in the highest possible class (C, M)0. A different VC checks that all
implementations respect the usual variance/co-variance rule for method redefi-
nitions.
∀i, f, c′ 4 C. (c′, f, i) ∈ γL(E(p)(y)) ⇒ (c
′, f, v) ∈ γL(E((C, M)0)(this))
∀i ∈ {0, 1}. E(p)(Vi)
•
⊑ E((C, M)0)(pi)
The constraint concerning the parameter this is a bit relaxed: we know that
the object y is not null and at most of class C. A different VC is in charge of
checking that the lookup never fails. The VC checks that the information on y
at the call point up to C is propagated to the information on this at the entry
point.
Finally, the VC checks that the information at the exit point (C, M)∞—i.e.,
the post-condition of the method—is propagated.
E((C, M)∞)(res)
•
⊑ E(p+)(x)
E((C, M)∞)(this)
•
⊓ E(p)(y)
•
⊑ E(p+)(y)
∀i ∈ {0, 1}. E((C, M)∞)(pi)
•
⊓ E(p)(Vi)
•
⊑ E(p+)(Vi)
Note that even if the semantics specify that the value—i.e., the location—of
the variables y, V0 and V1 is not touched by the call, the object they point to
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may have been modified by the call, e.g., more fields could be initiated. There-
fore, the information at the next program point on these variables is actually
the intersection of the information at the call point—i.e., E(p)(•)—and of the
information on the parameters—this for y, p0 for V0 and p1 for V1—at the exit
point of the method E((C, M)∞)(•), hence the use of the shorthand v
♯
1
•
⊓ v♯2
•
⊑ v♯3.
Conditional tests. A program point p annotated with a branching statement
Jnull(x, p′) generates one VC, with conditions related to the two branches. If
the information on x at program point p indicates that the variable can be null,
i.e., E(p)(x) ∈ γnull , then the jump may occur, therefore the information on x
at p′ must signal that x may be null, and the information on all other variables
must be propagated from p to p′.
E(p)(x) ∈ γnull ⇒ E(p
′)(x) ∈ γnull
∀v 6= x. E(p)(x) ∈ γnull ⇒ E(p)(v)
•
⊑ E(p′)(v)
As soon as the information on x at p indicates that the variable can be not-null,
i.e., if (c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(p)(x)) is true, then some executions may continue to p
+
and the information must be propagated accordingly.
∀c, i, f ∈ c. (c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(p)(x)) ⇒ (c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(p
+)(x))
∀v 6= x, ∀c, i, f ∈ c. (c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(p)(x)) ⇒ E(p)(v)
•
⊑ E(p+)(v)
Note that the information that x may be null at p is not propagated to p+, we
use a constraint a bit more relaxed than a simple E(p)(x)
•
⊑ E(p+)(x), and can
therefore certify guard-sensitive analyses i.e., exploit guards to refine analysis
results.
Object allocation. The VC for the x := new C statement is straightforward. It
only has to check—besides the fact that variables other than x are unchanged—
that the information on x at the next program point can account for the fact
that all the fields of the object stored in x have a inull annotation and have a
null value.
∀f ∈ C. (C, f, inull) ∈ γL(E(p
+)(x))
∀f ∈ C. (C, f, inull) ∈ γL(H(f)1) ⇒ H(f)2 ∈ γnull
Accesses in the heap. The VC for a program point p annotated with an access
in the heap x := y.f states that the information on f in the flow-insensitive
abstraction of the heap, i.e., H(f)2, should be propagated to the information on
x at the next program point. Nonetheless, recall that the abstraction of the heap
may distinguish between the possible annotations of f. Therefore, the informa-
tion fromH must be propagated to E(p+)(x) depending on what the information
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on y at p can say about the flag on y.f.
∀c, i.
f ∈ c⇒
(c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(p)(y)) ⇒(
(c, f, i) ∈ γL(H(f)1) ⇒ H(f)2 ∈ γnull
)
⇒
E(p+)(x) ∈ γnull
∀c, c′, f ′, i, i′.
f ∈ c⇒
(c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(p)(y)) ⇒(
(c, f, i) ∈ γL(H(f)1) ⇒ (c
′, f ′, i′) ∈ γL(H(f)2)
)
⇒
(c′, f ′, i′) ∈ γL(E(p
+)(x))
There are two kinds of information to propagate: f may be null, i.e., H(f)2 ∈
γnull , and the set of objects the abstraction of f may correspond to, hence the
two conditions. Remark that the parentheses does not allows the use of the
shorthand H(f)2
•
⊑ E(p+)(x).
Updates in the heap. The VC for a program point p annotated with an update
in the heap x.f := y checks that the information on y is propagated in the heap
E(p)(y)
•
⊑ H(f)2
but must also checks that the abstraction accounts for the update on the flag
attached to the field. It must be accounted for in the abstraction of the environ-
ment, for all objects in which f is defined, but only for the field f
∀c, i.
f ∈ c⇒
(c, f, i) ∈ E(p)(x) ⇒
(c, f, ifield(i)) ∈ E(p+)(x)
∀i, c, f ′ 6= f.
f ∈ c⇒
(c, f ′, i) ∈ γL(E(p)(x)) ⇒
(c, f ′, i) ∈ γL(E(p
+)(x))
and it must be accounted for in the heap.
∀c, f ′, i. (c, f, i) ∈ γL(E(p)(x)) ⇒ (c, f, ifield(i)) ∈ γL(H(f
′)2)
Theorem 1. Let P be a program and (H,E) be the untrusted result of an
analysis such that the instrumentation is monotonic. If the abstract VCs hold
for all the statements (∀p ∈ PP , s ∈ Stmt .get_stmt(p) = s ⇒ VC ♯
(H,E)
p (s))
and the abstract VCs hold for method redefinitions (∀m,m′.override(m′,m) ⇒
VC ♯
(H,E)
(m′,m)) then the concrete VCs hold and as a consequence the analysis
result is sound (Reach ⊆ γ(H,E)).
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This theorem is proved correct in our Coq development [7].
For each statement s ∈ Stmt at program point p which can potentially be
responsible for an error e ∈ Err we generate an abstract verification condition
Chk ♯(s)
(H,E)
p ruling out this error.
Chk ♯(x := y.f)
(H,E)
p = ¬(E(p)(y) ∈ γnull)
Chk ♯(x.f := y)
(H,E)
p = ¬(E(p)(x) ∈ γnull)
Chk ♯(x := y.c.m(v0, v1))
(H,E)
p =
{
¬(E(p)(y) ∈ γnull)
∧∀c′, f, i.(c′, f, i) ∈ E(p)(y) ⇒ c′  c
Theorem 2. Let P be a program and (H,E) be a sound analysis (Reach ⊆
γ(H,E)). If the abstract VCs hold for all the statements
∀p ∈ PP , s ∈ Stmt .get_stmt(p) = s⇒ Chk ♯
(H,E)
p (s)
then the absence of errors is guaranteed by the static analysis result (∀s, e.s ∈
Reach ⇒ s 6❀ e).
5 Experiments
For our experiments, we consider the null pointer analysis presented in Sec-
tion 3.3. To get type annotations, we have ported the NIT implementation [25]
to the Sawja platform [24] thus benefiting from a Bytecode Intermediate Lan-
guage [19] that is closed to the idealised language of Section 2. For the time being,
we do not generate VCs for BIR instructions that do not have a direct counter-
part in our idealised language. In particular, we ignore instructions manipulating
primitive types, static fields and static methods (with the notable exception of
constructors). Following Fähndrich and Leino [20], a constructor implicitly de-
fines all the fields of the current class. We emulate this behaviour by adapting
our VC for method returns. For a constructor, we add in the hypotheses that
the fields of the current class are necessarily defined.
For other instructions, we generate VCs according to Figure 1. At generation
time, verification conditions are partially evaluated with respect to the analysis
result. In particular, this is the case for terms of the form γL(E(p)(v), (c, f, i))
where E, p and v are constant or of the form γL(E(p)(v), (c, f, i)) where only E
and p are constant. The generated VCs are then processed by Why3 and sent to
different ATPs.
Results: All experiments [7] were done on a laptop running Linux with
4GB memory and Intel Core 2 Duo cpu at 2.93GHz. We used Why3 0.80 version
and tested the ability of different provers to discharge the VCs. We limited our
choice to provers to which Why3 could interface to off-the-shelf, and not, for
instance, the latest winners of the EPR category of the CASC competition [36].
We generated VCs for a limited set of small Java programs, testing the different
cases of the analysis. All VCs were discharged in less than 0.2 seconds, most
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in less than 0.05 seconds, times hardly significant. Some provers were not able
to discharge all VCs, TPTP provers in particular did not managed to discharge
most VCs. Among SMT provers, only CVC3 was able to discharge all VCs, alt-
ergo failing very quickly in some cases, and Z3 reaching timeout (5 seconds).
This differences could be due to the encoding we used, and more experiment
would be needed to understand why some provers performed better.
Nevertheless, our experiments showed that the VC calculus presented in Sec-
tion 4.2 produced VCs consistently discharged by multiple provers, therefore
demonstrating the relevance of the EPR fragment presented in Section 4.1 as a
framework for efficient result certification of object-oriented properties. The only
limiting factor to scalability appears to be the encoding of the class hierarchy
c′ 4 c and the relation f ∈ c. Analysing programs that use the standard Java
library may involve hundreds of classes and thousands of fields, and describing
an efficient encoding for relation on such large domains is a problem in its own
right.
6 Related Work
Static program analysis is a core technology for verifying software. Most static
analysers are complex pieces of software that are not without errors. Hence, we
have witnessed a growing interest in certified static analysis.
Certified static analysis has been pioneered by Necula in his seminal work on
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [32]. Necula insists on the fact that proof genera-
tion should be automatic and therefore invariant generation should be based on
static analysis. The back-end of a PCC architecture is a proof generating theo-
rem prover able to discharge the verification conditions. In a PCC setting, the
Touchstone theorem prover [33] generates LF proof terms for a quantifier-free
fragment of first-order logic enhanced with a specific theory for modeling types
and typing rules. For the family of static analyses we consider, a traditional VC-
Gen would not generate verification conditions in the scope of Touchstone. The
Open Verifier [14] aims at providing a generic Proof-Carrying architecture for
proving memory safety. For each analysis, a new type checker is an untrusted
module which, using a scripting language, instructs the kernel of a proof strategy
for discharging the verification conditions. In our work, the verification condi-
tions are compiled for our family of analyses and the verification conditions are
discharged using trusted solvers.
Foundational Proof-Carrying Code [2] proposes to reduce the TCB to a proof-
checker and the definition of the program semantics. A foundational proof of
safety for a static analyser can be obtained by certifying the analyser inside
a proof-checker. Klein and Nipkow have formalised the Java bytecode verifier
in Isabelle [27]. Pichardie et al. [13,34] formalised the abstract interpretation
framework [17] in Coq and used it to prove the soundness of several program
analysers. This approach requires to develop and prove in Coq the whole anal-
yser which is a formidable effort of certification and raises efficiency concerns,
Coq being a pure lambda-calculus language. Another way to obtain a founda-
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tional proof of safety is to certify, inside the proof-checker, a verifier of analysis
result rather than the analyser. Besson et al. [9] applied this result certification
methodology [38] to a polyhedral analysis, developing an analyser together with
a dedicated checker whose soundness is proved inside Coq. These works target
a single analysis but aim at a minimal TCB. Our approach is more automatic
and capture a family of analyses at the cost of integrating provers in the TCB.
However, generating foundational proofs for provers is also an active research
area [11,8,3]. These works pave the way for foundational proofs of family of
static analysis results.
Albert et al. [1] who have shown how results of the state-of-the-art static
analysis system COSTA can be checked using the verification tool Key. COSTA
produces guarantees on how resources are used in programs. Resource guarantees
are expressed as upper bounds on number of iterations and worst-case estimation
of resource usage, and injected into Key as JML annotations. The derived proof
obligations are proved automatically using the prover of Key.
7 Conclusion and Further Work
Result verification of abstract interpretation-based static analysers can be im-
plemented using ATP, by injecting the static analysis results into a program
verification tool, and generating the corresponding verification conditions. A
straightforward generation from the operational semantics will generate VCs
that are likely to be too complex for current provers. For this approach to work,
the verification conditions must be generated with care. We show how to gener-
ate VCs optimised for a class of analyses (here including byte code verification
and null pointer analysis) and which fall in a logical fragment that is amenable
to automatic proving. We have conducted a machine-checked proof (in Coq) that
these VCs are sound with respect to the standard VCs for the semantics. This
approach has been validated through an implementation with the Why3 tool
which is capable of verifying analysis results in a few seconds using off-the-shelf
solvers.
Further work includes larger experiments for assessing the scalability of our
approach. We are confident that our EPR VCs are easy instances (quantifica-
tions can be bounded by exploiting the class hierarchy) that will be discharged
without problem by off-the-shelf provers. However, this needs to be validated
experimentally. We also intend to widen the family of analyses in the scope of
our approach and study how to extend the class studied in the present paper
with relational numeric analyses. We expect the VCs to fall in a combination
of EPR with arithmetic. A longer-term research goal consists in automating the
generation of provably sound tractable VCs. Recently, Marché and Tafat have
shown how to prove a classic WP calculus in Why3 [31]. We will investigate how
to adapt this approach for custom Verification Condition Generators specialised
for classes of static analyses.
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A Operational Semantics
The semantic rules can be found in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.
Skip
get_stmt(s.cpp) = skip
s −→ (s.env, s.hp, s.cpp+)
Assign
get_stmt(s.cpp) = x := e x is assignable (s.env, e)⇒ v
s −→ (s.env[x← v] , s.hp , s.cpp+)
JumpNull
get_stmt(s.cpp) = Ifnull(t, p′) (s.env, t)⇒ null
s −→ (s.env , s.hp , s.cpp+)
JumpLoc
get_stmt(s.cpp) = Ifnull(t, p′) (s.env, t)⇒ l
s −→ (s.env , s.hp , p′)
New
get_stmt(s.cpp) = x := new c x is assignable
s.hp[l] = ⊥ o = λf.(null, inull)
s −→ (s.env[x← l] , s.hp[l← (c, o)] , s.cpp+)
Getfield
get_stmt(s.cpp) = x := y.f x is assignable
s.env[y] = l s.hp[l] = (c, o) o[f ] = (v, i)
s −→ (s.env[x← v] , s.hp , s.cpp+)
Putfield
get_stmt(s.cpp) = x.f := y s.env[x] = l s.hp[l] = (c, o)
v′ = s.env[y] (v, i) = o[f ] i′ = ifield(i) o′ = o[f ← (v′, i′)]
s −→ (s.env , s.hp[l← (c, o′)] , s.cpp+)
Call
get_stmt(s.cpp) = x := y.c0.m(a0, a1) x is assignable
s✄c0,m (init , pend) init −→
∗ end end .cpp = pend
s −→ (s.env[x← end .env[res]] , end.hp , s.cpp+)
SCall
s.env[y] = l s.hp[l] = (c, o) (s.env, a0)⇒ v0 (s.env, a1)⇒ v1
lookup(c)(c0,m) = c
′
sig(c′,m) = (pbeg, pend)
env′ = (λx.null)[this← l][p0 ← v0][p1 ← v1]
s✄c0,m ((env
′ , s.hp , pbeg), pend)
Fig. 2. Semantics
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GetfieldNullP
get_stmt(s.cpp) = x := y.f x is assignable
s.env[y] = null
s❀ NullPointer
PutfieldNullP
get_stmt(s.cpp) = x.f := y x is assignable
s.env[x] = null
s❀ NullPointer
CallNullP
get_stmt(s.cpp) = x := y.c0.m(a0, a1) x is assignable
s.env[y] = null
s❀ NullPointer
LookupFail
get_stmt(s.cpp) = x := y.c0.m(a0, a1) x is assignable
s.env[y] = l s.hp[l] = (c, o) lookup(c)(c0,m) = ⊥
s❀ LookupFail
Fig. 3. Error conditions
